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DEATH-TO-LIFE OVERRIDES: SAVING THE RESOURCES
OF THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
MICIHAEL L. RADELET* & MICHAEL MELLO**
F LORIDA'S death penalty statute is unique in that it allows trial
judges to reject juries' sentencing "recommendations" of life im-
prisonment.' This feature is shared only by the death penalty statutes
of Indiana, Alabama, and, after statutory change in late 1991, Dela-
ware.2 Between the enactment of Florida's statute in 1972 and March
23, 1992, trial judges in 134 Florida cases rejected juries' recommen-
dations of life imprisonment. The defendants in those cases were in-
stead sentenced to death, and by mid-1992 three of them had been
executed.'
In 1984 the United States Supreme Court held that this override
provision did not facially violate traditional doctrines under the U.S.
Constitution.4 The Court held in 1991 that the override as applied
could, in individual cases, violate the Eighth Amendment.'
Although researchers, including the authors, have examined the
questions raised by the possibility and patterns of life-to-death over-
* Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Florida. B.A., 1972, Michigan State
University; M.A., 1974, Eastern Michigan University; Ph.D., 1977, Purdue University; Postdoc-
toral Fellow, University of Wisconsin, 1977-79; Postdoctoral Fellow, University of New Hamp-
shire, 1990-91.
** Professor of Law, Vermont Law School. B.A., 1979, Mary Washington College; J.D.,
1982, University of Virginia.
1. FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1991). In Florida, life imprisonment is defined as a minimum of
25 years in prison before parole eligibility. Id. § 775.082(1).
2. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (Supp. 1991). In three states-Arizona, Idaho, and
Montana-the court alone imposes sentence in capital cases. In 29 other states, judges can im-
pose death only after a jury recommends death, unless the defendant waives jury sentencing. See
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463 n.9 (1984); Brief of the Office of the Capital Collateral
Representative of the State of Florida, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 12 n.7,
Sochor v. Florida, 112 S. Ct. 2114 (1992) (collecting statutory citations).
3. Ernest Dobbert (executed Sept. 7, 1984), Beauford White (executed Aug. 28, 1987), and
Bobby Francis (executed June 25, 1991).
4. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984). The Court has not yet decided whether cer-
tain aspects of the division of sentencing responsibility between judge and jury offends the U.S.
Constitution. See generally Michael Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously: The Un-
constitutionality of Capital Statutes that Divide Sentencing Responsibility Between Judge and
Jury, 30 B.C. L. REV. 283 (1989). Whether the override violates the state constitution is another
matter altogether. See Spaziano v. State, 489 So. 2d 720, 721 (Fla.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995
(1986) (holding that override does not offend the Florida Constitution); but see Michael Mello,
The Jurisdiction To Do Justice: Florida's Jury Override and the State Constitution, 18 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 923 (1991).
5. Parker v. Dugger, I ll S. Ct. 731 (1991).
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rides, 6 there has been little discussion of cases in which the jury rec-
ommends death but the judge instead imposes a sentence of life
imprisonment. We are aware of no individual newspaper articles,
scholarly research reports, or appellate decisions that discuss more
than one such case.' This Article attempts to fill that void.
I. THE OvERRIDE IN FLORIDA'S HISTORY
The bill that authorized Florida trial judges to override juries' sen-
tence recommendations in capital cases was passed in December 1972.
Before that, Florida had a century-old tradition of jury sentencing in
capital cases. Between 1872 and 1972, a jury's verdict for mercy was
final. By 1884 the Florida Supreme Court was able to state that "[tihe
law is positive. If a majority of the jurors recommend mercy, by
whatever motives they may be actuated (and these motives are not cir-
cumscribed), the court is bound to heed their verdict and pronounce
sentence accordingly." 8
Florida's statutory provision that a judge may override a jury's life
recommendation is not based upon any legislative or judicial judg-
ment that the life-to-death override serves a crucial state interest.
Rather, the provision is a product of the Legislature's reasonable mis-
understanding that such an override provision was required by the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia.,
6. Mello, The Jurisdiction To Do Justice, supra note 4; Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Missis-
sippi Seriously, supra note 4; Michael Mello & Ruthann Robson, Judge Over Jury: Florida's
Practice on Imposing Death Over Life in Capital Cases, 13 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 31 (1985);
Michael L. Radelet, Rejecting the Jury: The Imposition of the Death Penalty in Florida, 18 U.C.
DAvis L. Rav. 1409 (1985).
7. The lack of death-to-life overrides compared to the relative frequency of life-to-death
overrides means that the override, "as a practical matter," gives the prosecutor "two chances to
obtain a death sentence." Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 475 n.14 (1984) (Stevens, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part).
8. Newton v. State, 21 Fla. 53, 101 (1884) (emphasis in original). See also Garner v. State,
9 So. 835, 847 (Fla. 1891); Metzer v. State, 18 Fla. 482, 483 (1881) (syllabus citing the "Act of
February 27, 1872, ch. 1887" for the proposition that "in 'capital' cases, if a majority of the
jury recommended the accused to the mercy of the court, the sentence must be imprisonment for
life"); Keech v. State, 15 Fla. 591, 591 (1876) (same); Neil Skene, Review of Capital Cases: Does
the Florida Supreme Court Know What It's Doing?, 15 STETSON L. Ray. 263, 301 (1986) ("For
one hundred years, a jury's majority vote for life in a capital case was binding[.I"); cf. WILIAM
J. BowEas, LEGAL Houscwa 10-11 (1982) (identifying 1872 as the year Florida moved from
mandatory to discretionary capital sentencing); Mello, The Jurisdiction To Do Justice, supra
note 4 at 962-70 (discussing the status of Florida's capital sentencing law as of 1845, when the
state's first constitution became effective). "It is no wonder, in light of the tradition of jury
sentencing, that the [Florida] [S]upreme [Cjourt has proclaimed great deference to jury recom-
mendations of life." Skene, supra, at 302.
9. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). On Florida's post-Furman statute, see generally, Charles W. Ehr-
hardt & L. Harold Levinson, Florida's Legislative Response to Furman: An Exercise in Futility?,
64 J. Cusm. L. & CantDMOLOGY 10 (1973); Mello & Robson, supra note 6.
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It is not surprising that the Florida Legislature was baffled by Fur-
man. The "opinion" of the Court consists of a terse per curiam order
vacating the death sentences in the cases at bar, followed by nine sepa-
rate opinions of the individual justices.'0 No Justice in the five-person
majority joined in the opinion of any other. Furman continues to en-
gender controversy and to provide grist for critics both on and off the
Court."I
The capital statutes at issue in Furman were held unconstitutional
because they lacked standards to distinguish who should live from
who should not. The Court rejected capital sentencing systems that
facilitated arbitrariness and discrimination. Justices Brennan and
Marshall would have held the death penalty per se unconstitutional.' 2
Justices Stewart and White reasoned that arbitrariness voided the cap-
ital punishment statutes then in place in the United States. 3 Justice
Douglas stressed that the evil that inheres in a standardless system was
that it encourages sentencers to give legal (and irremedial) effect to
their race, class, and other prejudices. 4 Where the law grants unres-
tricted discretion, it creates the possibility that such discretion will be
misused by the powerful against the less powerful, including the poor
and minorities.
Florida's override statute was passed in direct response to the di-
verse concerns expressed in the various Furman opinions. Furman cre-
ated much confusion in Florida, as elsewhere, and the two houses of
the Florida Legislature divided sharply on the appropriate response to
it. 15
10. See generally Daniel D. Polsby, The Death of Capital Punishment? Furman v. Georgia,
1972 Sup. CT. REV. I (analyzing the separate opinions in Furman).
11. E.g., Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Louis Bilionis,
Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett Doctrine, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRI N-
NOLOGY 283 (1991); Scott Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and
Unguided Mitigation in Capital Sentencing, 38 U.C.L.A. L. RaV. 1147 (1991); Robert Weisberg,
Deregulating Death, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305, 315 (Furman "is not so much a case as a badly
orchestrated opera, with nine characters taking turns to offer their own arias."); id. at 317 ("In
the manner of literary criticism, one can extract unifying 'themes' in the Furman opi-
nions .... ).
12. Furman, 408 U.S. at 305 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring).
13. Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 312-14 (White, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 255-57 (Douglas, J., concurring).
15. The Florida Legislature responded to Furman by enacting its new statute in a matter of
frenetic days at a special session in late November and early December 1972. The Act was signed
by Governor Askew on December 8 and took effect immediately. Ch. 72-724, 1972 Fla. Laws 15.
Florida thus became the first state to enact a post-Furman capital statute. See generally Ehrhardt
& Levinson, supra note 9; Tim Thornton, Note, Florida's Legislative and Judicial Responses to
Furman v. Georgia: An Analysis and Criticism, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 108 (1974).
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The Florida Senate interpreted Furman as requiring jury considera-
tion of statutorily enumerated aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances, followed by jury rendition of an advisory opinion reached by
majority vote. Under the Senate's scheme, a verdict for life imprison-
ment would be binding, but a vote for death would be subject to the
judge's override. '6 However, the Governor, the Attorney General, and
the Florida House of Representatives interpreted Furman differently.
According to the House bill, the jury would be entirely excluded from
the penalty phase."
Faced with such opposing views, a conference committee formu-
lated a compromise. 8 This final version, which eventually became the
law, included aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the jury's
rendition of an advisory sentence that the judge could override in fa-
vor of either life or death. 9
The Florida Supreme Court perpetuated the legislative misunder-
standing of Furman by expressing the opinion that "allowing the jur-
y's recommendation to be binding would violate Furman[.]"20 Later,
however, the United States Supreme Court made it clear that "sen-
tencing by the trial judge certainly is not required by Furman"' and
that "[n]othing in any of [the Court's] cases suggests that the decision
to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution. ' 22
16. Ehrhardt & Levinson, supra note 9, at 15.
17. Ehrhardt & Levinson, supra note 9, at 14.
18. Ehrhardt & Levinson, supra note 9, at 15. State Senator Ed Dunn, one of the drafters
of the resulting statute, described the conference committee:
We went to Conference Committee and I can remember to this day that Conference
Committee going to about one-thirty or two o'clock in the morning. I remember talk-
ing to some of the members of the Senate whom I respect today and did then, and
some of them are still in the Senate. And going out in the hall and I remember one of
them asking me, do you really think it is better to go to judges as opposed to the jury.
No, we don't. We think we have to because Furman requires it. What we sat down or
really at that point stood there and worked out was a compromise, a cross if you will,
a hybrid between what was done in the Senate version and the House version. And
that cross was the utilization of the jury as a recommending authority on the question
of the ultimate sentence .... The question to me from the [Slenator was, well how do
we try to make ... the role of the jury consistent with the tradition in this state? And
frankly, we found no way to do it. At that time, we were of the opinion that we had
to have symmetry in the system, that we had to have [a] consistent role of the judge
and the jury, that we had to therefore permit a judge to overturn a recommended
sentence of mercy by the jury.
Mello & Robson, supra note 6, at 70, n.187.
19. See FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (1991).
20. Spaziano v. State, 433 So. 2d 508, 512 (Fla. 1983), aff'd on other grounds, 468 U.S. 447
(1984); see also Johnson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1069, 1074 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 882
(1981); Douglas v. State, 373 So. 2d 895, 897 (Fla. 1979).
21. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 463 n.8 (1984).
22. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).
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Furman invalidated prior sentencing schemes because they allowed the
sentencer unbridled discretion to impose death, not because they al-
lowed the jury the opportunity to extend mercy.
Nonetheless, this clarification was not sufficient to overcome the
inertia created by an existing-and constitutional-statute. So the
override is still permissible. Before critiquing the override, we will de-
scribe its theory and practice.
II. THE OVERRIDE IN PRACTICE
A. Tedder v. State
The language of Florida's capital statute provides that the jury's
sentencing recommendation is not binding: "[n]otwithstanding the
recommendation of a majority of the jury, the court, after weighing
the aggravating and mitigating circumstances" enters a sentence of
life or death.23 If a majority2 4 of the jury recommends death, regard-
less of whether the judge sentences the defendant to life, the court
must set forth in writing its findings as to aggravating and mitigating
circumstances. 25 Death sentences are subject to automatic review by
the Florida Supreme Court.2 6
The statute does not specify what degree of judicial deference, if
any, is owed to a jury's sentencing recommendation, so the question
was left to the Florida judiciary to resolve. The Florida Supreme
Court did so, at least as to instances where jury recommendations of
life are overridden, in Tedder v. State.27 The Tedder court held that
jury recommendations of life imprisonment may be overridden by the
judge only in those rare instances where "virtually no reasonable per-
son could differ" that death should be imposed in the case.2" The
United States Supreme Court in Proffitt v. Florida29 relied upon and
23. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (1991).
24. Although Florida's capital statute speaks in terms of a recommendation by a "major-
ity" of the jury, see id. § 921.141(2), a split vote of 6-6 is treated as a recommendation of life
imprisonment. See Patten v. State, 467 So. 2d 975, 980 (Fla. 1985); Rose v. State, 425 So. 2d
521, 525 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 (1983).
25. Section 921.141(3) requires written findings if the judge imposes death, regardless of
whether the jury recommended life or death. The Florida Supreme Court has required, pursuant
to its power to regulate practice and procedure, that judges imposing life sentences where the
jury has recommended death must also support the sentence by written findings. State v. Dixon,
283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974). However, according to our re-
search, courts seldom provide such findings.
26. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(4) (1991).
27. 322 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1975).
28. Id. at 910; see also Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d 928, 933 (Fla. 1989).
29. 428 U.S. 242, 249 (1976).
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quoted from Tedder in upholding the facial constitutionality of Flori-
da's capital statute as a whole (including the jury override). The Court
also stressed the Tedder standard in Spaziano v. Florida,30 by specifi-
cally upholding the facial constitutionality of the override itself.31 In
Parker v. Dugger,32 in invalidating the override as applied in that sin-
gle case, the Court reaffirmed its understanding that "under Florida
law, a sentencing judge is to override a jury's recommendation of life
imprisonment only when 'virtually no reasonable person could dif-
fer."' 33 Most recently, in Espinosa v. Florida,34 the Supreme Court
noted that its examination of Florida law indicated "that a Florida
trial court is required to pay deference to a jury's sentencing recom-
mendation, in that the trial court must give 'great weight' to the jury's
recommendation, whether that recommendation be life . . . or
death[.r 35
Jury recommendations of death are likewise accorded weight, al-
though the applicability of the stringent Tedder standard to death re-
commendations is not entirely clear. That is, may a judge override a
jury's recommendation of death only when "virtually no reasonable
person could differ"? The Florida Supreme Court recently observed
in dicta that "a jury recommendation of death should be given great
weight," just like a jury recommendation of life.36 For example, the
Florida Supreme Court applied the Tedder standard to a death recom-
30. 468 U.S. 447 (1984).
31. A year after Spaziano was decided, the Court held in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S.
320 (1985), that capital sentencers may not be misled about the importance of their decisions.
Florida's capital jury instructions as applied may well fall afoul of Caldwell. See Mann v. Dug-
ger, 844 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989); Adams v.
Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1986), modified sub nom. on other grounds, Adams v.
Dugger, 816 F.2d 1493 (1 lth Cir. 1987), rev'd on other grounds, 489 U.S. 401 (1989); compare
Harich v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1464 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1000 (1989);
see also Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously, supra note 4; Michael Mello, On Meta-
phors, Mirrors, and Murders: Theodore Bundy and the Rule of Law, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 887, 908-910 (1990-91). Some analogous studies were summarized in Section V of
Mello, Taking Caldwell v. Mississippi Seriously, supra note 4. This section was based on an
interactive research project that Robert Taylor completed when he was working as a law clerk
with Mello on Harich.
32. 111 S. Ct. 731 (1991).
33. Id. at 735 (1991) (quoting Tedder). "We hive held specifically that the Florida Supreme
Court's system of independent review of death sentences minimizes the risk of constitutional
error, and have noted the 'crucial protection' afforded by such review in jury override cases."
Id. at 739 (quoting Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 295 (1977) and citing Proffitt v. Florida,
428 U.S. 242, 253 (1976) and Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 465 (1984)). Cf. Lewis v. Jef-
fers, 110 S. Ct. 3092, 3103 (1990) (state court's finding of an aggravating circumstance "is arbi-
trary or capricious if and only if no reasonable sentencer could have so concluded").
34. 112 S. Ct. 2926 (1992).
35. Id. (citations omitted).
36. Grossman v. State, 525 So, 2d 833, 839 n.l (Fla. 1988).
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mendation in LeDuc v. State.37 LeDuc had pleaded guilty to a murder,
and the prosecutor, carrying out his end of a plea bargain, argued for
a life sentence. Nonetheless, the jury was unanimous in recommend-
ing death, and the trial judge agreed. The supreme court, citing Ted-
der, noted the recommendation of a jury "should not be disturbed
... unless there appear strong reasons to believe that reasonable per-
sons could not agree with the recommendation."
The same indirect application of Tedder occurred in Stone v.
State,39 when the court performed a proportionality review by com-
paring Stone's case with Swan v. State.40 In conducting this review the
jury's recommendation seemed to be outcome-determinative: "Swan's
jury recommended mercy while Stone's recommended death and the
jury recommendation is entitled to great weight."'" The death sen-
tence in Swan was reversed; in Stone it was affirmed. Tedder appears
to explain the difference.
The importance of the jury's sentence recommendation is further
underscored by the behavior of the Florida Supreme Court when it
finds error in jury proceedings that result in death recommendations.
As the Eleventh Circuit en banc court observed:
[T]he [Florida] [Slupreme [C]ourt will vacate the [death] sentence
and order resentencing before a new jury if it concludes that the
proceedings before the original jury were tainted by error. Thus, the
supreme court has vacated death sentences where the jury was
presented with improper evidence, or was subject to improper
argument by the prosecutor. The supreme court has also vacated
death sentences where the trial court gave the jury erroneous
instructions on mitigating circumstances or improperly limited the
defendant in his presentation of evidence of mitigating
circumstances. In these cases, the supreme court frequently focuses
on how the error may have affected the jury's
recommendation .... Finally, we note that the Supreme Court of
Florida has ordered resentencing in cases where the trial court
excused a prospective juror in violation of Witherspoon v. Illinois.42
The state supreme court in one of the three other jury override ju-
risdictions-Indiana-has gone further than the Florida Supreme
37. 365 So. 2d 149 (Fla. 1978).
38. Id. at 151.
39. 378 So. 2d 765 (Fla. 1979).
40. 322 So. 2d 485 (Fla. 1975).
41. Stone, 378 So. 2d at 772.
42. Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1452-53 (1ith Cir. 1988) (en banc) (footnotes and
citations omitted), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989).
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Court in clarifying the importance of jury recommendations of death.
Indiana requires more when judges override life recommendations
than when judges override death recommendations.
The Indiana Supreme Court began its recent work in override cases
by adopting a Tedder-like standard for life-to-death overrides in Mar-
tinez Chavez v. State.43 The court pointed out that only once before,
in Schiro v. State," had it affirmed a death sentence where the jury
had recommended life.45 The standard adopted by the Martinez
Chavez court echoed Tedder: "In order to sentence a defendant to
death after the jury has recommended against death, the facts justify-
ing a death sentence should be so clear and convincing that virtually
no reasonable person could disagree that death was appropriate in
light of the offender and his crime. "
Kennedy v. State also plows new ground in giving a standard for
trial courts to use in overriding death recommendations given by ju-
ries. 47 It is a less stringent standard than the Martinez Chavez!Tedder
standard that governs life-to-death overrides.
[Tihe trial court as trier of fact must independently determine the
existence of aggravators and mitigators, weigh them, consider the
recommendation of the jury, and come to a separate conclusion as to
whether or not to impose the death penalty. However, when the
jury's recommendation is [life], it is to be given a special-but not
controlling-role in the judge's process . . .4
43. 534 N.E.2d 731,734 (Ind. 1989).
44. 451 N.E.2d 1047 (Ind. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1003 (1987).
45. Martinez Chavez, 534 N.E.2d at 733.
46. Id. at 735. Other Indiana cases defer to the Martinez Chavez/Tedder standard. In Min-
nick v. State, 544 N.E.2d 471, 482 (Ind. 1989), the state supreme court upheld a judge override
of a life recommendation on the Martinez Chavez rule that "no reasonable person would find a
death sentence inappropriate here." In Minnick, the Indiana Supreme Court concluded that in
Martinez Chavez there were two men, one of whom could be viewed by reasonable people as less
culpable in the murder. Id. The court then reasoned that because Minnick was acting alone,
there was no basis for comparison. Id. This distinction was weak and may indicate a dissatisfac-
tion with the Martinez Chavez test. The sweeping assertion that no reasonable person could find
death to be inappropriate in Minnick's case indicates a willingness to allow the overriding of jury
recommendations. Further, despite the apparent high standard for override, the Indiana court
did not find it improper for a judge to tell a capital jury that their sentence was "a recommenda-
tion to the trial judge who would make the final determination." Evans v. State, 563 N.E.2d
1251, 1256 (Ind. 1990).
In another case, the same standard was used to order resentencing in an inappropriate over-
ride. Kennedy v. State, 578 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ind. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1299 (1992). In
Kennedy, the court remanded a case in which the judge overrode a jury's recommendation of life
imprisonment, directing the trial court to reconsider the sentence in light of the Martinez Chavez
standard. Id.
47. 578 N.E.2d 633 (Ind. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1299 (1992).
48. Id. at 637 (emphasis added).
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This suggests that the Tedder-type standard does not apply in cases
where the jury recommends death. To override a death recommenda-
tion the trial judge does not determine if any reasonable person could
disagree; the judge simply makes his or her own assessment of the
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. This suggestion is con-
firmed by Daniels v. State.4 9 "We do not require any trial court adher-
ence to a jury decision recommending imposition of the death penalty.
When the jury recommends the death sentence, a judge is in no way
bound by such recommendation."1 0 Hence, at least in Indiana, it is
less of a burden for the trial judge to reject a death recommendation
than to reject a life recommendation. The Florida Supreme Court has
yet to address the issue directly.
B. Problems with Life-to-Death Overrides
Two principal criticisms have been levied against the wisdom of per-
mitting trial judges to override juries' recommendations of life impris-
onment. The first centers on the historical role of the jury as the voice
of the community. The second suggests that the override provision is
not cost efficient because it results in so few affirmed death sentences.
Juries in death penalty cases are not genuinely representative of the
entirety of their communities because those citizens whose opposition
to or support for the death penalty may prevent or substantially im-
pair the performance of their duties may be excluded for cause from
service on capital juries.5'
More votes for life imprisonment in first-degree murder cases would
result if anti-death penalty citizens were permitted to sit on those ju-
ries and vice versa. Nonetheless, jurors are more representative of
their communities than are judges, who tend to be disproportionately
wealthy, white, and male. 2
Making jury recommendations of life imprisonment binding would
therefore increase the element of democracy in Florida death penalty
decisions. Under Tedder, if a judge overrides a jury's recommenda-
tion of life imprisonment, the judge is not-so-implicitly stating that
the jury is not composed of "reasonable people." This message may
not be well-received by jurors, who may resent judicial disregard of
their sentencing recommendation and regret their participation in
what turns out to be a case where a death sentence that they believe is
morally unjustified is imposed.
49. 561 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. 1990).
50. Id. at 491.
51. See Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424 (1985).
52. Mello & Robson, supra note 6, at 45-51; Radelet, supra note 6, at 1425.
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A second reason for making jury recommendations of life binding
is predicated upon interests of efficiency. The vast majority of death
penalty cases in which the jury recommends life imprisonment but the
judge imposes a death sentence are eventually reduced to life impris-
onment by a state supreme court, but only at the end of an arduous
(and costly) process of direct appeal to that court. "That the [Florida
Supreme C]ourt meant what it said in Tedder is amply demonstrated
by the dozens of cases in which it has applied the Tedder standard to
reverse a trial judge's attempt to override a jury recommendation of
life." The Florida Supreme Court, in Cochran v. State5 4 reiterated
its earlier statements that "[dluring 1984-85, we affirmed on direct
appeal trial judge overrides in eleven of fifteen cases, seventy-three
percent. By contrast, during 1986 and 1987, we have affirmed over-
rides in only two of eleven cases, less than twenty percent." 5 Overall,
in the two decades since Florida's current capital statute was enacted
in 1972, death penalty cases in which the jury recommended life have
been reversed in seventy-five percent of the cases, usually based en-
tirely on the override issue itself. 6
Hence, according to the Florida Supreme Court, the overwhelming
majority of death sentences that are imposed after a jury's recommen-
dation of life imprisonment are erroneous. The override cases levy
huge financial costs to both defendants and the state in correcting
these trial-level mistakes, and they burden the state supreme court
with death sentences that have little likelihood of being affirmed. In
short, life-to-death overrides hamper the efficiency of the appellate
courts, and they do so in a way particularly noxious to Florida's tradi-
tions of jury sentencing in capital cases.
III. DEATH-To-LIFE OVERRIDES
In contrast to life-to-death overrides, procedures allowing for
death-to-life overrides have a logic that is firmly rooted in Anglo-
53. Mann v. Dugger, 844 F.2d 1446, 1451 (11th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1071 (1989).
54. 547 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1989).
55. Id. at 933 (Shaw, J., specially concurring) (quoting Grossman v. State, 525 So. 2d 833,
851 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1071 (1989)). "This current reversal rate of over eighty
percent is a strong indicator to (trial] judges that they should place less reliance on their inde-
pendent weighing of aggravation and mitigation." Id.; see also Radelet, supra note 6, at 1412;
Michael L. Radelet & Margaret Vandiver, The Florida Supreme Court and Death Penalty Ap-
peals, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 913, 923 (1983); Mello, The Jurisdiction To Do Justice,
supra note 4, at 937.
56. The vast majority of these cases were reversed and life sentences mandated, pursuant to
application of Tedder. By the end of 1991, of the 136 override cases decided on direct appeal (in
some override cases there is more than one direct appeal decision), the Florida Supreme Court
reversed in 101 cases (case citations on file with authors).
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American jurisprudence. Furthermore, and also in contrast to life-to-
death overrides, allowing trial judges to reject juries' death recom-
mendations permits trial courts to conserve appellate resources by ef-
fectively restricting the death penalty to only the most aggravated
cases.
A. Their Consistency with Anglo-American Legal Traditions
If, for the reasons specified above, a jury's recommendation of life
should be binding, why should a jury's recommendation of death not
be binding? The answer is that Anglo-American legal traditions do
not treat the prosecution and defense equally: the traditions give the
benefit of any sizeable doubt to the defendant. For this reason, the
American Law Institute's Model Penal Code suggests that a jury's
"recommendation" of life, but not of death, be binding." This is so
for the reason expressed by the fifteenth-century jurist, Sir John For-
tescue: "Indeed, one would much rather that twenty guilty persons
should escape the punishment of death, than that one innocent person
should be condemned, and suffer capitally." 8 The United States'
criminal justice system is one which presumes the defendant is inno-
cent until proven guilty, and not one in which a person possesses no
presumptions and must be proven either guilty or innocent.
We recognize, of course, that abolishing the Florida judge's power
to override a jury's life recommendation, but not the power to over-
ride a death recommendation, would create an asymmetry. But it
would be "an asymmetry weighted on the side of mercy."5 9 Such an
"asymmetry is offensive ... only if one assumes that the grant of
mercy to some, based on their particularized circumstances, somehow
abridges the constitutional rights of others whose particular circum-
stances do not inspire mercy." 6 Asymmetry in death sentencing has
been declared constitutionally viable in the context of limiting aggra-
vating circumstances to those enumerated in the statute while allowing
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1980); see also Mello & Robson, supra note 6, at 57.
58. JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIDUS LEGUM ANGLIE 94 (F. Gregor trans., 1874); see gener-
ally Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment and Respect for Persons. Super Due Process for
Death, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1143 (1980); Margaret J. Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolv-
ing Standards for the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 989 (1978).
59. Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 960 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1219 (1984).
On mercy, see generally Paul W. Cobb, Jr., Reviving Mercy in the Structure of Capital Punish-
ment, 99 YALE L.J. 389 (1989).
60. Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1376 n.57 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 949 (1982).
OVERRIDES
mitigating circumstances to include any circumstance, whether listed
by the statute or not. 61
An analogy can be drawn by examining guilt decisions. In the guilt
phase of both capital and noncapital cases, a judge may reject a jury's
verdict of guilt of the maximum possible charge and instead find the
defendant guilty of a lesser included offense. 62 Or, the judge may en-
ter a judgment of acquittal despite the jury's rendition of a guilty ver-
dict. 63 However, trial judges are not permitted to adjudicate a
defendant guilty in cases where the jury has rendered a verdict of not
guilty." By analogy, a jury's recommendation of life in a capital mur-
der case can be interpreted as reflecting the jury's decision that the
defendant, while guilty of first-degree murder, is not guilty of a capi-
tal (i.e., death-deserving) offense. Hence, allowing the judge to over-
ride death recommendations-but not life recommendations-is not
only constitutionally permissible, but is in accordance with basic te-
nets of Anglo-American jurisprudence. It is the ability to override life
recommendations that is the historical and normative anomaly.
Allowing judges to override death recommendations is also in ac-
cordance with Florida's historical and jurisprudential traditions. As
discussed above, Florida's jury override was enacted in a reasonable
attempt to comply with the ethereal commands of Furman v. Geor-
gia.65 For the century before Furman-1872 to 1972-a Florida jury's
verdict for mercy was final.66
Further, the logic supporting the override, as articulated by the Leg-
islature in enacting the override and by the Florida Supreme Court in
upholding its constitutionality, is effective only when. applied to cases
in which judges override death recommendations, not vice versa.
When the Florida Supreme Court first considered Florida's post-Fur-
man statute, the court focused on the override provision solely in
61. The Florida Supreme Court has held that "aggravating circumstances enumerated in the
statute . . . are exclusive; no others may be used for that purpose." Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4,
6 (Fla.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 847 (1977); see also Miller v. State, 373 So. 2d 882, 885 (Fla.
1979); Elledge v. State, 346 So. 2d 998, 1002 (Fla. 1977), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 981 (1982).
Though this principle is not required by the United States Constitution, Barclay v. Florida, 463
U.S. 939, 949-51 (1983), it appears to be firmly established law in Florida.
By contrast, the U.S. Constitution mandates that the capital sentencer be permitted to con-
sider and give independent mitigating weight to any relevant mitigating circumstance, even if not
enumerated in the capital statute. See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987); Eddings v. Okla-
homa, 455 U.S. 104, 110 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978).
62. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 454 n.5 (1984).
63. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.380(c).
64. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.690.
65. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
66. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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terms of the judge overriding a jury's recommendation of death. The
court concluded that "the inflamed emotions of jurors can no longer
sentence a man to die; the sentence is viewed in the light of judicial
experience." ' 67 As one commentator, apparently generally in favor of
the death penalty, has noted: "[P]ermitting the judge to reject death
and grant life is justified. The community sometimes becomes in-
flamed on debatable facts, and raises the hue and cry for vengeance.
The judge should be permitted to act as a detached overseer to re-
strain passion-numbed judgments.' '8
This reasoning is particularly true when support for the death pen-
alty is as strong as it is today. In a 1992 Gallup Poll, sixty-five percent
of the respofidents said they would be more likely to vote for a politi-
cal candidate who backs a mandatory death penalty for murder. 9
Many of these supporters would therefore be inclined to vote for a
death sentence for any murderer, and not simply for the most aggra-
vated cases that the death penalty is intended to address.70 The ability
of trial judges to reject a jury's recommendation of death is necessary
to guard against any unrestricted zeal for capital punishment that may
find voice in the jurors' penalty votes.
B. Their Pragmatic Benefits
Another reason Florida trial judges are permitted to override death
recommendations is appellate efficiency. The rendering of life sen-
tences by conscientious trial judges in cases that are not appropriate
for death conserves the resources of the appellate courts and clemency
authorities for more aggravated cases. This is a quasi-proportionality
point: The override allows immediate judicial intervention to sidetrack
less aggravated cases before the defendant is sent to death row. Fre-
quently, death penalty cases with death recommendations are reduced
to life by the Florida Supreme Court on grounds of proportionality, 71
especially in recent years. 72 Permitting trial judges to reject death re-
67. State v. Dixon, 283 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974).
68. Joseph W. Little, Another View, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 200, 204 (1984).
69. Richard Benedetto, Economy Shakes American Dream, U.S.A. TODAY, Jan. 16, 1992,
at AS; see also James A. Fox et al., Death Penalty Opinion in the Post-Furman Years, 18
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 499 (1990-91).
70. Only about 1/60 of the criminal homicides in the United States result in a death sen-
tence. See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, The Role and Consequences of the Death
Penalty in American Politics, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CANEoa 711, 714 n. 11(1990-91).
71. For a review of these cases, see Craig S. Barnard, Death Penalty, 13 NOVA L. REV. 907,
974-76 (1989).
72. See, e.g., Tillman v. State, 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991); Nibert v. State, 574 So. 2d 1059
(Fla. 1990); Fitzpatrick v. State, 527 So. 2d 809 (Fla. 1988); Livingston v. State, 565 So. 2d 1288
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commendations allows an early and efficient means to filter out cases
for which the death penalty is inappropriate.
The recent decision in Tillman v. State'3 underscores the vigor of
proportionality review of death sentences in Florida. In Tillman, no
record had been developed that outlined the actual facts of the crime.
On appeal, the state supreme court discussed the importance of pro-
portionality review in capital cases, listing three justifications for it.14
First, the "requirement that death be administered proportionately
has a variety of sources in Florida law, including the Florida Constitu-
tion's express prohibition against unusual punishments. 71 5 Second,
proportionality review in death cases "rests at least in part on the rec-
ognition that death is a uniquely irrevocable penalty, requiring a more
intensive level of judicial scrutiny or process than would lesser penal-
ties."76 Third, proportionality review
arises in part by necessary implication from the mandatory, exclusive
jurisdiction this Court has over death appeals. The obvious purpose
of this special grant of jurisdiction is to ensure the uniformity of
death-penalty law .... [P]roportionality review is a unique and
highly serious function of this Court, the purpose of which is to
foster uniformity in death-penalty law.71
Because the Tillman court could not resolve the proportionality issue
on the record, the court reduced the death sentence to life: "all doubts
must be resolved in favor of Tillman, since his state constitutional
right is to receive a proper proportionality review[.] '"78
This sidetracking of less aggravated cases is functional, however,
only if the cases in which death-to-life overrides occur are relatively
less aggravated than other capital cases and therefore have a small
probability of affirmation by appellate courts. Alternatively, it could
be argued that the death-to-life override provision gives less conscien-
tious judges the opportunity to thwart the will of the community by
refusing to sentence deserving defendants to death.
(Fla. 1988); Banda v. State, 536 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1988). cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1087 (1989);
Amoros v. State, 531 So. 2d 1256 (Fla. 1988); Lloyd v. State, 524 So. 2d 396 (Fla. 1988); Proffitt
v. State, 510 So. 2d 896 (Fla. 1987); Wilson v. State, 493 So. 2d 1019 (Fla. 1986); Ross v. State,
474 So. 2d 1170 (Fla. 1985); Rembert v. State, 445 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1984); Blair v. State, 406 So.
2d 1103 (Fla. 1981).
73. 591 So. 2d 167 (Fla. 1991).
74. Id. at 169.
75. Id. (citing FLA. CONSr. art. 1, § 17).
76. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 9).
77. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(l)).
78. Id. (citing FLA. CONST. art. I, §§ 9, 17).
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Which of these positions is more accurate is an empirical question
that can be resolved only by examining the cases in which the death-
to-life override has actually been used. Each position becomes a testa-
ble hypothesis.
Support for the first hypothesis would be found if death-to-life
overrides were infrequent and ranked relatively high on mitigation
and low on aggravation. Support for the second hypothesis would be
found if the cases in which the death-to-life override was used were
highly aggravated, involved anti-death penalty judges, and were fol-
lowed by sustained community protests. We now turn to the data used
to test these two competing hypotheses.
IV. DATA ON DEATH-TO-LIFE OVERRDES
Unfortunately, there is no central source that can be consulted to
identify cases in which a judge rejected a jury's recommendation of
death. 9 Unlike cases ending in the imposition of death sentences,
cases in which life sentences are imposed cannot be appealed directly
to the Florida Supreme Court; hence, information on relevant cases
cannot be obtained from that source. 0 Instead, to identify cases in
which judges rejected a jury's recommendation of death, we relied on
personal contacts who knew about this research, letters to prosecutors
and defense attorneys involved in capital litigation, and newspaper
clippings. This methodology uncovered a total of fifty-one relevant
cases, but we cannot and do not claim completeness. These cases are
listed in Appendix A.
The fifty-one cases involve forty-seven defendants. One defendant,
William Cruse (Nos. 17-20) had four death recommendations overrid-
den, while another, Rudolph Zadnick (Nos. 50-51) had two death re-
commendations overridden. Three women are among the defendants
(Dee Casteel, No. 4, Julita de Parias, No. 21, and Katherine Telema-
chos, No. 47). The first such override of which we are aware occurred
79. Justice Stevens noted in Spaziano that
[i]f there are any cases in which the jury override procedure has worked to the defen-
dant's advantage because the trial judge rejected a jury's recommendation of death,
they have not been brought to our attention by the Attorney General of Florida, who
would presumably be aware of any such cases.
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 475 n. 14 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring and dissenting). At
the hearings on Florida House Bill 820 (1984), Chair Elvin Martinez told the Committee on
Criminal Justice that he had instructed his staff to obtain information on death overrides but
that "[ilt's not easily available. It's going to almost require the [S]tate [Ajttorneys going through
their files and their cases .... " Mello & Robson, supra note 6, at 66 n.169.
80. Capital cases are appealed automatically to the Florida Supreme Court. FLA. STAT. §
921.141(4) (1991).
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in November 1974 (Zadnick, Nos. 50-5 1), while the most recent oc-
curred in December 1991 (Telemachos, No. 47). The forty-seven de-
fendants were sentenced to their terms of life imprisonment in the
following years:
Table 1
Death-to-Life Overrides By Year, 1974-91
1974 1 1983 0
1975 2 1984 2
1976 0 1985 5
1977 1 1986 2
1978 1 1987 12
1979 0 1988 6
1980 4 1989 5
1981 0 1990 3
1982 2 1991 1
Of the forty-seven defendants, ten were sentenced to death on other
counts: James Bryant (No. 3), Dee Casteel (No. 4), Michael Irvine
(No. 5), William Rhodes (No. 6), Guy Cochran (No. 13), David Cook
(No. 15), William Cruse (Nos. 17-20), Joseph Garron (No. 24), Domi-
nick Occhicone (No. 38), and George Porter (No. 39).
Of the remaining thirty-seven defendants, five were teenagers at the
time of the crime: Ted Bassett (No. 2), James Bullard (No. 7), Eddie
Ferguson (No. 22), Lovonza Robinson (No. 43), and Katherine Tele-
machos (No. 47). A sixth, Michael Canady (No. 9), had his age
(twenty-one) cited in mitigation and, as in Bassett's case, the jury's
vote for death in Canady's case was seven to five.
Of the remaining thirty-one cases, in at least six the jury vote was
seven to five: Ronald Hale (No. 26), Thomas Hall (No. 27), James
Mays (No. 34), Clarence Morris (No. 36), Michael Nelson (No. 7),
and Gilbert Selver (No. 44). In most death penalty jurisdictions, a
seven-to-five vote for death would automatically necessitate the impo-
sition of a life sentence."' Under the Tedder standard, it is clear that
reasonable people differed.
In three other cases, the victim's closest relative made a plea that
the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment. In the case of Robert
Combs (No. 14), the victim's mother testified that she believed that
Combs was innocent (the judge also expressed some doubts about
Combs' guilt). The mother of Randall Jones' victim (No. 29) and the
widow of Charles Young's (No. 49) victim also asked for mercy, and
the judges in both cases cited extensive mitigation.
81. Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1980) (appendix).
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The Combs case is not the only one where some doubts about the
defendant's guilt, role in the crime, or premeditation were cited as
reasons for a life sentence. In the case of Julita de Parias (No. 21), the
judge felt the State had not proven its argument that de Parias acted
in a leadership role in the homicide. Thomas Hall's (No. 27) judge
cited the lack of premeditation, and in sentencing George Taylor (No.
46) to life, the judge was probably influenced by the defendant's argu-
ment of self-defense. In Florida, "[a] convicted defendant cannot be
'a little bit guilty.' It is unreasonable for a jury to say in one breath
that a defendant's guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt
and, in the next breath, to say someone else may have done it, so we
recommend mercy." 8 2
Nineteen cases remain. In seventeen of these, the judge held that the
aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances with enough sufficiency to justify a death sentence. For exam-
ple, James Baily (No. 1) and Edward Cleveland (No. 12) were
sentenced to life after the State failed to present sufficient aggravating
circumstances. In Carlton Camper's case (No. 8), the trial judge said
the aggravating circumstances necessary for a death sentence simply
were not there. In the case of Joseph Marter (No. 33), Judge Kaney
stated much the same, adding, "[it would be the easy thing, the poli-
tic thing, to sentence this defendant to death and let the Supreme
Court take the heat for lowering it to life." 83
Two cases do not fit into the above categories. In sentencing
Thomas Crow (No. 16) to life imprisonment, the trial judge admitted
that he erred in allowing the jury to hear inadmissible testimony, and
he felt this error would cause the Florida Supreme Court to reverse a
death sentence if one was imposed. Hence, as in so many other cases,
the death-to-life override saved the supreme court from having to con-
duct an in-depth review before rejecting the death sentence. In the fi-
nal case, that of Thomas Lackner (No. 31), the judge did not state his
reasons for dismissing the jury's death recommendation. Since the de-
fense argued that Lackner's mental status at the time of the crime was
a powerful mitigator, we can speculate that the trial judge agreed.
82. Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 953 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); see
also Burr v. State, 466 So. 2d 1051, 1054 (Fla. 1985). But see Heiney v. Florida, 469 U.S. 920,
921 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Smith v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d
1248, 1255 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088 (1985); MODEL PENAL CODE,
§ 210.6(1)(f) and cmt. 5 (1980).
83. Mary R. Heffron, Murderer Given Life Sentence, Despite Jury's Vote for Death, SEN-
TINEL STAR (Orlando), Apr. 1, 1980, at C3.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Several conclusions can be drawn from the above data. The first
concerns the frequency of death-to-life overrides. They are rare; the
total of fifty-one cases, after excluding multiple charges on one defen-
dant and cases in which the defendant was sentenced to death on
other charges, is reduced to thirty-seven. This figure is the best meas-
ure of the number of defendants spared a death sentence because of
the trial judge's override power. There have been 3.6 times as many
life-to-death overrides (134) in Florida since 1972 as there have been
death-to-life overrides (37), and thus the number of these cases is
quite small. This may be because trial judges are unaware that the life-
to-death override provision has actually been used.
Second, if trial judges fear that overriding a jury's death recom-
mendation may result in negative political repercussions for their ca-
reers, they will be relieved to learn that there is not a scintilla of
evidence that supports such fears. In only two cases have there been
protests about a death-to-life override (Ramirez, No. 40, and Taylor,
No. 46), and in both cases the protests quickly subsided after being
heard. No judge in our data set has ever suffered political repercus-
sions because of use of death-to-life override powers.
Third, the patterns show that evidence of strong mitigation was
present in virtually all the cases. To be sure, some more retributive
judges may have weighed the aggravating and mitigating evidence dif-
ferently in a given case and sentenced the defendant to death, but even
the death penalty's strongest supporters would no doubt admit that,
at best, the death-to-life override cases are only marginally qualified
for death sentences.
Fourth, the evidence of mitigation in the cases strongly suggests
that most, if not all, of the trial judges in these cases would have been
reversed by the state supreme court had they followed the jury's ad-
vice and imposed a death sentence. The data indicate that by imposing
the life sentence themselves, the trial judges simply saved the state su-
preme court from the hassle-and the wasted cost. Because the Flor-
ida Supreme Court is already spending about half its time on death
penalty cases,14 sidetracking these marginal cases before they arrive in
Tallahassee has saved the state significant fiscal resources.
Fifth, because of the resource-saving feature of the death-to-life
overrides, those who oppose executions in Florida may want to con-
84. This estimate comes from Florida Supreme Court Justice Kogan, quoted in the National
Law Journal. See Marcia Coyle et al., Trial & Error in the Nation's Death Belt: Fatal Defense,
Fatal Flaws, NAT'L L.J., June 11, 1990, at 30.
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sider the possibility of working to abolish the possibility of death-to-
life overrides. Despite resulting in more death sentences, this could be
an appealing abolitionist policy for two reasons. First, it would invite
extensive litigation to ascertain the constitutional permissibility of
such a ban, thereby removing the attention of prosecutors and the
courts from other litigation that might result in quicker executions.
Second, sending the fifty-one cases reviewed above to the state su-
preme court (and similar cases in which death sentences would be im-
posed in future years if the abolitionists are successful) would
probably not result in more executions (given the high probability of
reversal), but fewer executions, as they would divert the limited re-
sources of courts and prosecutors from more aggravated death pen-
alty cases. The time it would take the state supreme court to review
these death-to-life override cases would force further delays in decid-
ing the more aggravated death penalty cases, hence delaying execu-
tions or even giving the defendants in these more aggravated cases
more time to document mitigation or find other reasons that would
entitle them to a life sentence. In short, the more death sentences in
these less aggravated type of cases there are, the fewer the number of
total executions there will be.
Finally, the data contain no evidence that the death-to-life override
is being used by judges who are morally opposed to the death penalty
as a way to thwart the will of the community and to spare the most
heinous criminals from the state's electric chair. Those who might fa-
vor abolishing the death-to-life overrides because of the potential for
abuse by anti-death penalty judges have nothing to worry about.
Only three judges have used their discretion to override death re-
commendations in more than one trial: Judge Thomas S. Reese (in the
cases of Christopher Ferguson, No. 23, and Juan Rivera, No. 42),
Judge John Antoon (in the cases of William Cruse, Nos. 17-20, James
Mays, No. 34, and George Porter, No. 39), and Judge Ralph N. Per-
son (in the cases of James Bryant and his three codefendants, Nos. 3-
6, and Julita de Parias, No. 21). Furthermore, these three judges are
clearly not death penalty abolitionists, as each has imposed death sen-
tences on multiple occasions. Judge Reese has imposed the death pen-
alty five times; 85 Judge Antoon sentenced Cruse and two other men to
85. One of these defendants is Robert Combs (No. 14). A second is James McCrae, who
was sentenced to death by Judge Reese despite the jury's unanimous recommendation of life
imprisonment. See McCrae v. State, 582 So. 2d 613 (Fla. 1991). Judge Reese also sentenced
Harold Lucas to death twice; see Lucas v. State, 568 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1990); Lucas v. State, 490
So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1986). The final defendant he sentenced to death was George South. See Wil-
liam Sabo, Judge Gives South Death, FT. MYERs NEws-PPuEss, Feb. 11, 1988, at Al.
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death;86 Judge Person sentenced Bryant and his three codefendants to
death on other counts, as well as one other man (twice). 7
We therefore reject the hypothesis that the death-to-life override
provision gives less conscientious judges the opportunity to thwart the
will of the community by refusing to sentence deserving defendants to
death. Instead, the data support the hypothesis that the death-to-life
override provides a valuable function for the criminal justice system
by allowing trial judges to sidetrack less aggravated cases from the
death penalty appellate system. Conscientious trial judges struggling
to decide what to do in cases in which there has been a recommenda-
tion of death despite solid mitigation should find it useful to know
that there is strong precedent for overriding the jury's death recom-
mendation.
86. These men are George Porter and Crosley Green. See Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060
(Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1024 (1991); Robert Kohlman, Brevard Killer Sentenced To
Die, FLA. TODAY (Brevard County), Feb. 9, 1991, at BI.
87. That man is Levarity Robertson. He was condemned to death by Judge Person on
March 21, 1989, and again on August 21, 1989, after a separate trial for another murder. See
letter from Steven waiter, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, to Michael L. Radelet
(Dec. 1, 1991) (copy on file with authors).
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APPENDIX A: INVENTORY OF CASES
1. Bailey, James Warren. September 26, 1988. Tampa. Bailey was
convicted of the kidnap, rape, and murder of a prostitute. The victim
had been selling drugs for Bailey and allegedly had cheated him out of
some of the proceeds. Bailey murdered the prostitute, dismembered
the body with a power saw and stored it in his freezer for three years
before it was discovered. Judge Richard A. Lazzara reportedly said
that recent (unspecified) decisions by the Florida Supreme Court pro-
hibited the imposition of the death penalty in the case because the
state failed to present sufficient aggravating circumstances, and that
the most horrifying aspects of the murder occurred after the victim's
death. 8
2. Bassett, Ted. November 17, 1989. Daytona Beach. Bassett was
convicted of killing two teenagers by locking them in a car trunk and
pumping in exhaust fumes. In 1980 Bassett was sentenced to death for
the crimes, and his codefendant was sentenced to life. The Florida
Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence in 1984.89 On
further collateral review, the supreme court ordered a new sentencing
hearing because Bassett's trial attorney had failed to present nonstatu-
tory mitigating evidence at trial. 90 At resentencing in 1989, the jury
voted 7-5 to reimpose death. But Judge S. James Foxman (who had
originally imposed the death sentence) disagreed, citing Bassett's age
at the time of the crime (eighteen), his miserable childhood (Bassett
was conceived in a rape and he had seen his mother repeatedly abused
by a series of alcoholic stepfathers), and the fact that the codefen-
dant's life sentence would make a death sentence for Bassett "wrong
and unjust." 9
3-6. Bryant, James; Dee Casteel; Michael Irvine; and William
Rhodes. September 15, 1987. Miami. All four defendants were con-
victed of killing Arthur Venecia and his mother, Bessie Fischer. The
jury recommended death on both counts for all four. Judge Ralph N.
Person sentenced all four defendants to death on one count, but over-
rode the death recommendation on the other count.
Casteel's 10-2 death recommendation for the Venecia murder was
overridden because she was not present at the scene when he was
killed.
88. Ivan J. Hathaway, Bailey Gets 3 Life Sentences, TAMPA TRmi., Sept. 27, 1988, at B2.
89. Bassett v. State, 449 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 1984).
90. Bassett v. State, 541 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1989).
91. Robert Nolin, Murder Victims' Families Outraged, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-JOURNAL,
Nov. 18, 1989, at Al; Shirish Date, This Time, Judge Spares Daytona Murderer, ORLANDO SEN-
TINEL, Nov. 18, 1989, at DI.
OVERRIDES
Irvine's 11-1 death recommendation for the Venecia murder was
overridden because Irvine was not the person who caused Venecia's
death.
Rhodes's 10-2 death recommendation for the Fischer murder was
overridden because his involvement in her death was "relatively mi-
nor."
Bryant's 11-1 death recommendation for the Fischer murder was
overridden because he "was not present at or near the scene of the
murder."
In 1990 the Florida Supreme Court granted new trials to the four
defendants because of improper jury selection and the fact that the
defendants had not been tried separately. 92
7. Bullard, James. October 7, 1982. West Palm Beach. Bullard, age
nineteen, was convicted of stabbing a plumber. The jury voted 9-3 for
death. Judge Edward Rodgers overrode, reportedly because it was not
clear if Bullard was the actual murderer or simply an aider and abet-
tor. 93
8. Camper, Carlton Henry. January 16, 1987. Orlando. Camper, a
pimp, was convicted of killing a prostitute who no longer wanted to
work for him. Judge Gary Formet, in overriding the jury's recommen-
dation, said that the aggravating circumstances necessary for a death
sentence were simply not there. 4
9. Canady, Michael. March 27, 1987. West Palm Beach. Canady
(black), age twenty-one at the time of the crime, was convicted of kill-
ing a white Florida Highway Patrol Officer who discovered a suitcase
of marijuana in the trunk of Canady's car. The jury voted 7-5 for
death. Judge William Owen overrode, reportedly because of Canady's
age, lack of prior record, remorse, and his brevity of intent to kill (the
defendant's judgment was clouded by marijuana and alcohol)-all
factors that (according to newspaper reports) Judge Owen said would
cause the Florida Supreme Court to vacate any death sentence. 95
92. Carlos Harrison, New Trial Ordered for 4 in Dade on Death Row, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 30, 1990, at BI; Jay Ducassi, Waitress Gets Death Penalty: First Woman in Dade To Be
Sentenced To Die, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 17, 1987, at BI; Jay Ducassi, Two Auto Mechanics
Given Death Sentence for Killing for Hire, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 16, 1987, at B4. See also Sen-
tencing Memoranda in State v. Casteel (No. 84-9397B), State v. Irvine (No. 84-9397C), State v.
Rhodes (No. 84-9397D), and State v. Bryant (No. 84-9397A), (Fla. I lth Cir. Ct. 1987). See also
Bryant v. State, 565 So. 2d 1298, 1299 (Fla. 1990); GARY PROVOST, WITHOUT MERCY (1990).
93. John Purnell, Teenager Receives Life Term: Parole for Bullard Possible in 25 Years,
THE POST (Palm Beach), Oct. 8, 1982, at C2.
94. Selwyn Crawford, Man Gets Life in Prostitute's Killing: Orange Judge Overrides Jury's
Recommendation for the Death Penalty, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 17, 1987, at D6.
95. Gary Kane, Canady Spared His Life: Jury Overruled on Death Sentence, PALM BEACH
POST, Mar. 28, 1987, at BI. This case should not be confused with another capital case from
Florida, in which Michael Eugene Cannady (no relation) was sentenced to death for a 1979
murder. See Cannady v. State, 427 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1983).
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10-11. Chandler, Ronald and Richard Cravero. July 25, 1975. Mi-
ami. Chandler and Cravero were convicted of the murder of a former
partner; their falling out was associated with control over an interna-
tional cocaine smuggling ring. Chandler's defense attorney, Gerald
Kogan (who later was appointed to the Florida Supreme Court), told
the jury that "two deaths for one is never right .... [D]eath is a very
final, final thing. When you are dead and buried, and somebody finds
out that [a witness] lied, you can't resurrect them." Judge Dan Satin
reportedly agreed, stating that "[d]eath is a truly awesome punish-
ment." He said that he found no aggravating circumstances that
would justify a death sentence. 96
12. Cleveland, Edward Clifton. September 12, 1980. Pensacola.
Cleveland was convicted of killing a fifteen-year-old girl who had run
away from her home in Ohio. Judge William Frye III sentenced
Cleveland to life, reportedly because the State failed to prove the ag-
gravating circumstances necessary to impose a death sentence. "Judg-
ing from the evidence alone the court cannot allow the death penalty
to be imposed solely on the fact that the victim's body was dismem-
bered."' 9 Public Defender Terry Terrell argued that the jury improp-
erly considered post-death events.
13. Cochran, Guy Reginald. October 11, 1985. Tampa. Cochran
was convicted of abducting a nineteen-year-old woman from a night-
spot and killing her. He was also convicted of killing Leon Arbelaez in
a robbery four days previously. The jury recommended a life sentence
for the woman's murder and death for the Arbelaez murder. How-
ever, Judge Donald Evans overrode both recommendations. 8 The
Florida Supreme Court wrote:
In the Arbelaez case, Cochran pulled a gun on a drug dealer outside
a bar and demanded his money. When the victim advanced on
Cochran, Cochran backed up and fell over a planter. The victim
grabbed Cochran and attempted to take his gun. Cochran shot the
victim in the chest and fled.99
96. Gayle Pollard, 'Death Is Awesome:' Two Get Life, MIAMI HERALD, July 26, 1975, at
BI; John Camp, Jury Favors Death for 2: Third Gets Life, MIAMI HERALD, July 15, 1975, at B2.
Both men later escaped from prison but were recaptured. Escapee Captured, MIMtI HERALD,
Jan. 28, 1988, at B3; Joan Fleischman, Notorious Dade Killer on the Loose: Escape Befuddles
Prison Officials, MIAMI HERALD, Sept. 10, 1987, at Al.
97. Carlton Proctor, Cleveland Gets Life Sentence for Killing 15- Year-Old-Girl, PENSACOLA
JOURNAL-NEWS, Sept. 13, 1980, at CI; Carlton Proctor, Death: Jury Recommends Electric Chair
for Cleveland, PENSACOLA JOURNAL-NEWs, Aug. 2, 1980, at CI.
98. Man Receives I Death, I Life Sentence in Murders, TAMPA TRm., Oct. 13, 1985, at B4.
See also Cochran v. State, 547 So. 2d 928, 931 n.3 (Fla. 1989) (judge's override of the jury's
recommendation of life imprisonment for the woman's murder was not warranted).
99. Cochran, 547 So. 2d at 932 n.5.
0 VERRIDES
14. Combs, Robert Ike. October 26, 1988. Fort Myers. In 1980 fol-
lowing a jury's recommendation, Judge Thomas S. Reese sentenced
Combs to death for a drug-related murder. After initially affirming
the conviction and sentence in 1981,'00 in 1988 the Florida Supreme
Court, on collateral review, ordered resentencing with a new jury.'0'
At the new hearing, the victim's mother testified that she thought
Combs was innocent. Nevertheless, the jury voted to recommend a
death sentence. Judge James Thompson overrode this recommeida-
tion, reportedly stating that imposition of the death penalty would ne-
cessitate complete reliance on the testimony of the victim's boyfriend
and that he had some reasonable doubts about the credibility of that
testimony. 02
15. Cook, David. October 25, 1985. Miami. Cook was convicted of
two counts of murder; the jury recommended death on each count.
The victims, a married couple, were members of the cleaning crew at a
Miami Burger King and had been shot during a robbery. According to
Judge Thomas M. Carney's sentencing memorandum, he overrode the
jury's death recommendation for the murder of the husband, but not
for the wife, because there were no sufficient aggravating circum-
stances in the husband's murder. The wife was the second person
shot; thus, the first murder was used as an aggravating circumstance
in sentencing Cook to death for her murder. In addition, murdering
her eliminated a witness to the first murder and, because she was ter-
rorized before being murdered, her death was especially cruel. 103 In
1989 the Florida Supreme Court ordered a new sentencing hearing in
the case because two of the aggravating circumstances found by the
trial judge were not supported by the evidence. ,o4 However, Cook was
resentenced to death. 10 5
16. Crow, Thomas Floyd. April 26, 1985. Panama City. In sentenc-
ing Crow to life after the jury recommended death (by an 8-4 vote),
Judge N. Russell Bower reportedly said that he had "committed an
error" by letting the jury hear certain testimony during the penalty
100. Combs v. State, 403 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 984 (1982).
101. Combs v. State, 525 So. 2d 853 (Fla. 1988).
102. Tony Katsulos, Convicted Killer Won't Go to Chair: Judge Overrules Jury Recommen-
dation, Sentences Combs to Life in Jail, FT. MYERS NEWS-PRESS, Oct. 27, 1988, at BI; Devi Sen,
New Verdict Expected Today in Murder Resentencing Trial, FT. MYERS NEWS-PRESS, Oct. 21,
1988, at B5.
103. See Cook v. State, 542 So. 2d 964, 966 (Fla. 1989), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 252 (1991);
Sentencing Memorandum, State v. Cook (No. 84-19874) (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Oct. 25, 1985); Cou-
ple's Killer Gets Death Penalty, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 26, 1985, at B2.
104. Cook, 542 So. 2d at 970-71.
105. Cook v. State, 581 So. 2d 141 (Fla.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 252 (1991).
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phase. The testimony concerned the fact that the victim had engaged
in homosexual activity shortly before his death. 16
17-20. Cruse, William Bryan. July 29, 1989. Bartow (on venue
change from Brevard County). Cruse was convicted of killing six peo-
ple in a shooting rage at a Palm Bay shopping center. The jury recom-
mended death on all six counts. Cruse was sentenced to death for two
of the killings (police officers). Judge John Antoon sentenced Cruse
to life sentences for the other four murders, despite jury votes of 11-1,
11-1, 10-2, and 1 I-1 for death. According to his sentencing memoran-
dum, Judge Antoon did so because Cruse's "extreme mental distur-
bance" outweighed the aggravating circumstances.107
21. De Parias, Julita. September 17, 1988. Miami. De Parias was
the lover of Jesse Ramirez (No. 40), but was tried separately for the
murder of the son of a wealthy Dade County developer. The jury
voted 9-3 for death. In overriding that recommendation, Judge Ralph
Person stated that the State's attempt to portray De Parias as the
leader of the homicide plot had failed. 10
22. Ferguson, Eddie Joe. November 7, 1990. Fort Myers. Ferguson
was convicted of killing a woman during a robbery. Ferguson was
only sixteen years old at the time of the crime. Judge William Nelson
decided not to conduct a penalty phase because he did not believe that
appellate courts would uphold a death sentence. In 1990 the Second
District Court of Appeal ordered Judge Nelson to proceed with sen-
tencing.109 Despite the defendant's age and an I.Q. of seventy-one, the
jury voted 10-2 in favor of a death sentence. Judge Nelson disagreed
and sentenced Ferguson to life.110 The sentence was imposed on Fergu-
son's twentieth birthday.
23. Ferguson, Christopher Leroy. December 3, 1986. Fort Myers.
Ferguson was convicted of breaking into the apartment of his next-
door neighbor and killing her with a hammer. The jury voted 11-1 for
106. Mike Cazalas, Bower Gives Crow Life Prison Term for Murder, NEws-HERALD (Pan-
ama City), Apr. 27, 1985, at 1; Ron Wiginton, Jury Recommends Crow Die in Electric Chair,
NEws-HERALD (Panama City), Sept. 5, 1984, at Cl.
107. Sniper in Palm Bay Slaying Sentenced to Death, FLA. Tmes-UNmoN (Jacksonville), July
30, 1989, at Al; Cruse Receives Death Sentences in Shooting Spree: Judge Rejects Mental-Illness
Plea, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale), July 29, 1989, at A24; Sentencing Memorandum, State v.
Cruse (Case No. 87-1763-CF-A) (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. July 29, 1989). On appeal, Cruse's convic-
tions and death sentences were affirmed. Cruse v. State, 588 So. 2d 983 (Fla. 1991).
108. Christine Evans, Duct Tape Ringleader Gets Life Term, MAM HERALD, Sept. 17, 1988,
at BI.
109. State v. Ferguson, 556 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990).
110. Peter Franceschina, Lee Killer, 20, Gets Life in Prison: Judge Rejects Death Penalty for
Ferguson, NEws-PRss (Ft. Myers), Nov. 7, 1990, at BI; Peter Franceschina, Jury Recommends
Death for Killer: Ferguson, 20, Faces Sentencing Today, NEws-PRESS (Ft. Myers), Nov. 6, 1990,
at BI.
OVERRIDES
death. Judge Thomas S. Reese reportedly said that the law did not
make the death penalty appropriate in this case. "'
24. Garron, Joseph Henry. October 4, 1985. New Port Richey. Gar-
ron was convicted of killing his wife and thirteen-year-old stepdaugh-
ter. The jury voted to recommend the death penalty by 9-3 and 12-0
votes respectively. While waiting for trial, Garron was twice found
incompetent to stand trial. At trial, three psychiatrists testified that he
was insane. Judge Lawrence E. Keough overrode the jury's recom-
mendation for the wife's murder. At the same time, following the jur-
y's death recommendation as to the daughter, Judge Keough found
that the daughter was killed to eliminate a witness and that she had
not died until she suffered from being shot four times.112 Garron was
condemned to death for that murder.
25. Graham, Doyle Curtis. September 25, 1980. Fernandina Beach.
Graham (white) was convicted of killing a convenience store clerk
(black); the all-white jury recommended death. Judge Henry Lee Ad-
ams, Jr. (black), who reportedly characterized himself during the sen-
tencing proceedings as a "philosophical opponent" of capital
punishment, said the circumstances of the crime did not justify the
death penalty. '"
26. Hale, Ronald Frederick. October 23, 1984. Tampa. Hale was
convicted of two murders. For one he was convicted of second-degree
murder; for the other, a stabbing of a sixteen-year-old girl, his jury
recommended death by a 7-5 vote. Judge John P. Griffin overrode
this recommendation, reportedly because, as the judge put it, the "ag-
gravating circumstances haven't been sufficiently proved" because
Hale was under the influence of drugs on the night of the crimes. " 4
27. Hall, Thomas Edward. July 12, 1985. Tampa. Hall was con-
victed of armed burglary, aggravated battery with a firearm, posses-
sion of a firearm during commission of a felony, and first-degree
murder for killing his girlfriend's husband in a domestic dispute.
11l. Denes Husty, Hammer Murderer Gets Life, NEWS-PRESS (Ft. Myers), Dec. 4, 1986, at
B1.
112. Garron v. State, 528 So. 2d 353, 355 (Fla. 1988); Michael Wade, Garron Receives Death
Sentence, TAMPA Taun. (Pasco Trib. ed.), Oct. 5, 1985, at 1; Sentencing Memorandum, State v.
Garron (No. 82-2123CFAWS) (Fla. 6th Cir. Ct. Oct. 10, 1985). A new trial was ordered on
appeal.
113. Jonathan Rogers, Death Penalty Rejected, FLA. TIMEs-UNIoN (Jacksonville), Sept. 26,
1980, at 83; Jonathan Rogers, Jury Recommends Death for Killer of Store Clerk, FLA. TtmES-
UNION (Jacksonville), July 3, 1980, at 83.
114. Robert Samek, Hale's Life Is Spared, TAMPA Tam., Oct. 24, 1984, at BI. Hale won a
new trial in 1986 because of the improper exclusion of a black male from his jury. Hale v. State,
480 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
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Judge M. William Graybill overrode the jury's 7-5 death recommen-
dation, reportedly because of the lack of premeditation, 5
28. Jackson, James. April 17, 1978. Starke. Jackson was convicted
with Bennie Demps and Harry Mungin of a prison murder; the victim
was a "snitch." According to the prosecution, Mungin served as the
lookout while Demps held the victim, and Jackson stabbed him; post-
conviction investigation in Demps' case has cast significant doubt
upon this version of the events. Judge Wayne Carlisle, following the
jury's recommendations, sentenced Mungin to life and Demps (who
had been serving a life sentence at the time of the crime) to death.
Jackson's death recommendation was not followed, according to
newspaper reports, because "the case was not strong enough that 'do-
gooders' couldn't carry it to the Supreme Court and claim that the
death penalty would be cruel and unusual punishment." 6 The past
criminal records of the defendants reportedly were strong influences
on the judge's decisions. 117
29. Jones, Daniel Clinton. January 25, 1990. Bartow. Jones was
convicted of murdering his girlfriend, and the jury voted 8-4 to rec-
ommend death. The victim's mother had asked that a life sentence be
imposed. Judge E. Randolph Bentley imposed a life sentence, report-
edly noting that "because of the combination of mental factors and
organic brain damage that diminished the defendant's ability to con-
form to the requirements of the law .... he should not be released or
considered for parole." The judge also noted Jones' "horrendous and
abusive family life" (including being raped at age five), brain damage
that "probably" resulted from the abuse, and his "long periods of
institutional confinement" as a child." 8
30. Jones, Freddie Cecil. May 6, 1987. Miami. Jones was sentenced
to death in 1982 for the murder of a truck driver. He won a new trial
in 1985." 9 At his retrial, he was convicted of second-degree murder.2 0
115. Malcolm Spicer, Murderer Sent to Jail, Not Electric Chair, TAMPA TtIB., July 13, 1985,
at B4; Hall v. State, 505 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
116. Percy Hamilton, Demps Sentenced to Death for Inmate Knife Slaying, FLA. TnAEs-UN-
ION (Jacksonville), Apr. 18, 1978, at BI (paraphrasing statements by Judge Carlisle).
117. Id.; R. Michael Anderson, Death Penalty in Prison Slaying Is Upheld, FLA. TIMEs-UN-
ION (Jacksonville), Jan. 9. 1981, at B3; Bill Shields, Inmate Receives Death Sentence, GAINES-
VILLE SUN, Apr. 18, 1978, at 1.
118. Andy Sidden, Judge Overrules Jury, Gives Life Term, THE LEDGER (Lakeland), Jan.
26, 1990, at BI; Beth Foushee, Man Gets Life Sentence, No Parole, TAMPA Tram., Jan. 26, 1990
(Polk County Supp.) at 1.
119. Jones v. State, 464 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 1985).
120. Jones was sentenced to 402 years. See Miami Man Gets 402 Years in Slaying, MIAMI
HERALD, March 18, 1986, at D2. This conviction was affirmed on appeal. Jones v. State, 508 So.
2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987).
0 VERRIDES
Three months before that murder, Jones allegedly killed another truck
driver after hijacking his truck. At trial for this murder in 1987, the
jury voted 8-4 for death. According to newspaper reports, Judge Nor-
man Gerstein refused to elaborate on the reasons why he disagreed
with this recommendation, but he did say, "I did what the law re-
quired me to do."' 2'
31. Lackner, Ronald Paul. March 14, 1988. Inverness. Lackner was
convicted of murdering his estranged wife. The jury voted 12-0 to rec-
ommend the death penalty. In mitigation the defense argued that the
murder was committed when Lackner was experiencing emotional
trauma because of the impending divorce. Judge Thomas Sawaya re-
portedly did not specify his reasons for overriding the jury's recom-
mendation. 12
32. Lusk, Bobby Earl. May 11, 1977. Miami. Lusk and a codefen-
dant were convicted of murdering a seventy-one-year-old hotel guest
who suffocated after being gagged during a robbery of her hotel
room. Both defendants were offered life imprisonment in exchange
for a guilty plea, but only the codefendant accepted the deal. Judge
Wilkie D. Ferguson, Jr. overruled the jury's death recommendation,
reportedly because of evidence of limited premeditation, and added,
"[tihe death penalty in this case would be tantamount to executing
[Lusk] for taking advantage of his constitutional rights."' 23 In 1980
Lusk was sentenced to death (after a jury recommendation of life) for
a prison murder. 24
33. Marter, Joseph Alan. March 31, 1980. Orlando. Marter was
convicted of first-degree murder for stabbing a nineteen-year-old
woman; the jury unanimously recommended death. Judge Frank N.
Kaney reportedly said the killing "does not rise to Florida standards
for the death penalty .... It would be the easy thing, the politic
thing, to sentence this defendant to death and let the Supreme Court
take the heat for lowering it to life."' 25
121. Jay Ducassi, Judge Sentences Two- Time Killer to Three Consecutive Life Terms, MIAmn
HERALD, May 7, 1987, at D7.
122. Keith Morelli, Lackner Receives Life in Prison; Death Recommendation Rejected,
OcALA STAR BANNER, March 15, 1988, at B2; Cindy Cokely, Lackner's Life Spared: Judge Gives
Man Life Sentence for Murder, CITRUS COUNTY CmtON., Mar. 15, 1988, at 1; Cindy Cokely,
Jury Recommends Death Penalty, 12-0. for Lackner, CITRUS CoUtYnt CtRON., Dec. 18, 1987, at
1.
123. Killer Sentenced to Three Life Terms, MIAmi HERALD, May 12, 1977, at C5. The con-
viction was affirmed on appeal. Lusk v. State, 367 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
124. Deborah Charnal, Inmate Gets Death Sentence, GMNESVILLE SUN, Feb. 6, 1980, at 13.
As of early 1992, Lusk remained on death row for this conviction. Lusk v. Dugger, 583 So. 2d
1035 (Fla.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 425 (1991).
125. Mary R. Heffron, Murderer Given Life Sentence, Despite Jury's Vote for Death, SEN-
TINEL STAR (Orlando), Apr. 1, 1980, at C3.
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34. Mays, James, Jr. February 29, 1989. Melbourne. Mays was con-
victed of shooting a man who had startled him in a dark parking lot.
The jury voted 7-5 for death. Judge John Antoon overrode this rec-
ommendation, reportedly because the defendant's history of mental
problems went back to when he was only two years old. 126
35. Mitchell, Joseph. May 25, 1988. Live Oak. Mitchell was con-
victed of raping and killing a seventeen-year-old woman during the
burglary of her home. The jury voted 9-3 to recommend the death
penalty. Judge John Peach disagreed with this recommendation, re-
portedly saying that there were more mitigating circumstances than
aggravating circumstances."'
36. Morris, Clarence. May 11, 1984. St. Petersburg. Morris was
convicted in the death of an eighty-five-year-old woman who died af-
ter being mugged. The jury (mostly elderly) voted 7-5 in favor of a
death sentence for Morris; they also voted to recommend a life sen-
tence for his codefendant. Judge Susan Schaeffer sentenced Morris to
life, reportedly because she felt it necessary to treat both defendants
similarly. A second reason for the override was Morris' long history
of mental problems. 2 "
37. Nelson, Michael. March 9, 1982. West Palm Beach. Nelson was
convicted of killing his wife in hopes of obtaining $80,000 from her
life insurance policy. The jury recommended death by a 7-5 vote. The
victim drowned in her bathtub; earlier Nelson had tried to poison her.
The victim's sister told the judge that she opposed the death penalty.
Judge Marvin Mounts rejected the jury's recommendation, reportedly
saying, "I cannot classify this crime as especially heinous, atrocious
or cruel under the existing Florida law." 29
38. Occhicone, Dominick A. November 9, 1987. New Port Richey.
Occhicone was convicted on two counts of first-degree murder for
killing his estranged fiancee's parents, and the jury voted 7-5 to rec-
ommend the death penalty on both counts. Judge Lawrence E.
Keough followed the jury's recommendation for the mother's
murder'30 but overrode it for the father's death. The mother suffered
126. Robert Kohiman, Mays Given Life in Prison for Slaying, FLA. TODAY (Melbourne),
Feb. 28, 1989, at BI; Robert Kohiman, Jury Wants Death for Killer of Kansas Man, FLA. TODAY
(Melbourne), Dec. 7, 1988, at BI.
127. Susan Lamb, Killer of Teen Girl Sentenced to Life, GAINESVILLE SUN, May 26, 1988, at
B3.
128. Lynda Richardson, Judge Overrides Jury, Sentences Man to Life in Fatal Mugging, ST.
PETERSBURG TImEs, May 12, 1984, at B12.
129. Anne Krueger, Nelson Must Serve Life Prison Term for Wife's Murder, TN POST
(Palm Beach), March 10, 1982, at Cl.
130. This death sentence was affirmed on appeal. Occhicone v. State, 570 So. 2d 902 (Fla.
1990), cert. denied, Il1 S. Ct. 2067 (1991).
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more anguish than the father because the father was shot first; she
knew this and had to spend several terrified minutes before she was
shot. Further, since the father died relatively quickly, Judge Keough
did not find his murder to be especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. 3 ,
39. Porter, George. March 4, 1988. Melbourne. Porter pleaded
guilty to killing his former girlfriend and her new boyfriend; the jury
unanimously recommended death for the woman's killing and, by a
10-2 vote, death for the man's murder. At trial, Porter acted as his
own attorney before abruptly pleading guilty (and that night he at-
tempted suicide). Judge John Antoon sentenced Porter to death for
the woman's murder but to life imprisonment for the murder of her
companion. He found that the woman's murder was especially hei-
nous, atrocious, and cruel, as well as cold and calculated, because
Porter had threatened the victim on numerous occasions and the vic-
tim did not die instantaneously. 32
40. Ramirez, Jesse. June 25, 1987. Miami. Ramirez and three others
were convicted of kidnapping the son of a wealthy Miami developer.
When a ransom scheme failed, they bound the victim with duct tape,
and he suffocated. The jury voted 10-2 to recommend a death sen-
tence for Ramirez. Nonetheless, Judge Steven Robinson sentenced Ra-
mirez to life, citing the defendant's long history of child abuse and his
recent conversion to Christianity. A second defendant in the case, Ju-
lita de Parias (No. 21) also had a jury recommendation of death over-
ridden in her case. Two months after the sentencing, about 150
protesters marched to protest the rejection of the death penalty. The
victim's father (an influential member of the Latin Builders Associa-
tion) reportedly said: "[tihis man will never be judge again. I don't
care what it costs me."' 33 Nonetheless, in 1990 Judge Robinson was
easily reelected. 3 4
131. David Sommer, Occhicone Sentenced to Death, TAMPA TRn. (Pasco County ed.), Nov.
10, 1987, at I.
132. Elizabeth Baker, Porter Given Death Penalty, FLA. TODAY (Melbourne), March 5, 1988,
at BI; Elizabeth Baker, Jury Urges Electric Chair in Porter Trial: Final Decision Up to Circuit
Judge, FLA. TODAY (Melbourne), Jan. 23, 1988, at BI; Elizabeth Baker, Prosecutors Seek Death
for Porter, FLA. TODAY (Melbourne), Jan. 22, 1988, at Bl; Sentencing memorandum, State v.
Porter, (No. 86-5546-CF-A) (Fla. 18th Cir. Ct. March 4, 1988). Porter's death sentence was
affirmed on appeal. Porter v. State, 564 So. 2d 1060 (Fla. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1024
(1991).
133. Sentencing memorandum, State v. Ramirez, (No. 85-16798A)(Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. June
25, 1987); 153 Protest Murder Case Sentence, MIM HERALD, Aug. 18, 1987, at B2; Dave Von
Drehle, Duct-Tape Ruling May Put Judge in Political Danger, MIAMI HERALD, June 28, 1987, at
B2; Jay Ducassi, Slain Man's Kin Irate at Life Term for Killer, MIAMI HERALD, June 27, 1987, at
Dl.
134. THE AMERICAN BENCH, JUDGES OF THE NATION 602 (Marie T. Hough et a]. eds., 6th ed.
1991-92).
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41. Rippley, Michael Wallace. February 21, 1989. Bartow. Despite
relentless protestations of innocence, Rippley was convicted of killing
his wife (six weeks after their marriage); the jury voted 11-1 to recom-
mend a death sentence. Judge J. Tim Strickland rejected this recom-
mendation, reportedly saying "the aggravating circumstances offered
by the state were not sufficient to outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances offered by the defendant." Judge Strickland noted the "cir-
cumstantial nature" of the evidence in the case.'35
42. Rivera, Juan Sota. August 21, 1986. Fort Myers. Rivera was
convicted of shooting a man in a fight outside a bar, and his jury
recommended death by an 8-4 vote. Rivera had also been convicted of
third-degree murder in 1973. Judge Thomas Reese reportedly said that
the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances, and therefore he sentenced Rivera to life imprisonment. 36
43. Robinson, Lovonza. May 16, 1980. Sebring. Robinson (age
nineteen at the time of the crime) and two codefendants (ages fifteen
and seventeen at the time of the crime) were convicted of the torture-
murder of a sixty-two-year-old man. The codefendants were sentenced
to life imprisonment, but Robinson's jury voted 9-3 to recommend
death. Judge John H. Dewell disagreed, reportedly citing the fact that
the codefendants were not sentenced to death and that some doubts
existed about the veracity of the state's chief witness (one of the code-
fendants who was permitted to plea bargain to a lesser charge in ex-
change for his testimony). "7
44. Selver, Gilbert. February 3, 1989. West Palm Beach. Selver was
convicted of first-degree murder for hiring a man to kill a customer
who had failed to complete a drug deal. The alleged triggerman was
acquitted. Judge Harold Cohen disagreed with the jury's 7-5 vote to
recommend death, reportedly because the alleged triggerman was ac-
quitted, the victim was involved in the drug culture, and the death
penalty should be reserved for "a narrow range of cases . . .which
truly cry out for its use." According to The Palm Beach Post, the
closeness of the jury's vote influenced the judge's decision: "[t]he 7-5
vote is by no means an overwhelming statement."' 38
135. Judgment and Sentence of Michael Rippley, (No. CF88-979) (Fla. 10th Cir. Ct. Feb. 21,
1989); Andy Sidden, Judge Gives Rippley Life in Prison, THE LEDGER (Lakeland), Feb. 22,
1989, at BI; Beth Foushee, Rippley Gets Life in Prison, TAMPA Tam., Feb. 22, 1989, at 1.
136. Beth Francis, Killer Receives Life Term, NEws-PREss (Ft. Myers), Aug. 22, 1986, at BI.
137. David Nicholson, Man's Sentence Life for Mutilation Murder, TAMPA TREa. (Heartland
ed.), May 17, 1980, at BI; David Nicholson, Jury Recommends Death in Mutilation Murder
Case, TAMPA TRm. (Heartland ed.), Feb. 27, 1980, at BI; David Nicholson, Jury Finds Avon
Park Man Guilty in Mutilation-Murder, TAMPA TRIr. (Heartland ed.), Feb. 15, 1980, at Al.
138. Angela Bradbery, Judge: Drug Murder Not Serious Enough for Death Sentence, PALM
OVERRIDES
45. Sorey, William June. August 17, 1987. Marianna. Sorey was
convicted of killing a friend in a "petty gambling dispute."' 39 The de-
fense argued that the victim might have died anyway because ambu-
lance technicians inserted an oxygen tube inserted into the victim's
stomach instead of his lungs. The jury voted 8-4 to recommend death.
Judge Robert L. McCrary sentenced Sorey to life. 40
46. Taylor, George William. August 14, 1987. Tampa. Taylor was
convicted of killing a man with a meat cleaver. Taylor had agreed to
engage in homosexual relations with the victim (whom he had met at a
bar) for thirty dollars, and a dispute developed over payment. Taylor
argued the killing had been done in self-defense. The jury voted 11-1
to recommend a death sentence. Judge John P. Griffin disagreed. Af-
ter the sentencing, five jurors spoke out against the judge's decision.14'
47. Telemachos, Katherine. December 20, 1991. Ft. Lauderdale. As
a nineteen-year-old, Telemachos was convicted of hiring two men to
murder her father. The jury deliberated for thirty-three minutes be-
fore recommending death by an 8-4 vote. In sentencing her to life,
Judge Charles Greene reportedly cited her emotional immaturity and
childhood health problems. She had suffered repeated kidney failures
and, at age ten, she was one of the first Americans to survive a liver
transplant. Judge Greene, a former prosecutor, had suffered from a
life-threatening cancer as a child. 142
48. White, Victor J. July 17, 1987. Sanford. White was convicted of
killing the fourteen-month-old son of the woman with whom he was
living; the jury voted 9-3 to recommend execution. Judge 0. H. Ea-
ton, Jr., rejected this recommendation, reportedly because the murder
was not especially "heinous, atrocious, and cruel." 143
49. Young, Charles "Biff." July 15, 1990. West Palm Beach.
Young was convicted of beating to death a seventy-eight-year-old se-
curity guard; the weapon was a wrought-iron flamingo yard decora-
BEACH POST, Feb. 4, 1989, at B2 (quoting Judge Cohen). The conviction was reversed on appeal,
and a new trial was ordered because of errors in the admission of a collateral crime and hearsay
evidence. Selver v. State, 568 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
139. Robyn Hearn, Jury Recommends Death for Sorey, JACKSON COUNTY FLORIDLN, June
25, 1987, at 1.
140. Id.; letter from Jackson County Clerk of Courts, Sept. 6, 1991 (on file with authors).
141. Bayard Steele, Judge Goes Against Jury, Gives Murderer Life Sentence, TAMPA TRI.,
August 15, 1987, at B4; Overruled Jurors Blast Judge for Sparing Killer, MIAMI HERALD, Aug.
22, 1987, at D2. The life sentence was affirmed on appeal. Taylor v. State, 563 So. 2d 822 (Fla.
2d DCA 1990). See also Taylor v. State, 586 So. 2d 1345 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991).
142. Fred Grimm, Did Immaturity, or Color, Spare Killer?, MtM~ HERALD, Dec. 22, 1991,
at C7; Judge Finds Mercy in Memories, TA.LAHAS.SEE DEMOCRAT, Dec. 22, 1991, at B6.
143. Brad Church, Baby Killer Gets 'Life': Judge Sets Aside Death Recommendation, SAN-
FORD HERALD, July 17, 1987, at 1.
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tion. Young, who acted as his own attorney at trial, was given a death
recommendation by a 9-3 vote. Judge Walter Colbath, a former fam-
ily court judge, reportedly said that Young was "the product of one
of the most dysfunctional families seen by the court, spanning three
generations." The family had a history of alcoholism, abuse, and ne-
glect. In rejecting the jury's recommendation, the judge also noted
that the victim's widow had asked for a life sentence.'"4
50-51. Zadnick, Rudolph Daniel. November 27, 1974. Orlando.
Zadnick was convicted of killing the woman with whom he had been
living (for five days) and her five-year-old son. The murder weapon
was a frying pan. Judge Peter de Manio overrode the jury recommen-
dations (12-0 for the boy and 10-2 for the mother), reportedly because
he believed the jury might have been unduly influenced by the fact
that one of the victims was a child. 45
144. Christine Stapleton, Man Gets Life for Bludgeoning Murder: Victim's Wife Didn't
Want Death Penalty, PALM BEACH POST, July 14, 1990, at B2.
145. Paul Jenkins, Judge Overrides Jury as Zadnik Gets Life, SENTINEL STAR (Orlando),
November 28, 1974, at BI.
